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Coverage of the Euro Crisis in Spanish, German, British, and American Elite Newspapers

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COVERAGE OF THE EURO CRISIS IN SPANISH, GERMAN, BRITISH, AND
AMERICAN ELITE NEWSPAPERS

by

Katrina Schwarz

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT
COVERAGE OF THE EURO CRISIS IN SPANISH, GERMAN, BRITISH, AND
AMERICAN ELITE NEWSPAPERS

by

Katrina Schwarz

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor David Pritchard

This study examined the relationships among culture, economic policy, and news content in the European economic context. The three variables can affect one another, and the effects of information and policy can influence the future of the European Union. The culture measure included opinion and government support in the news. The economic policy measure included austerity and bailout stances. Content analysis of news content from significant periods in 2011 and 2012 in elite Spanish, German, British and American news revealed differences in news coverage. The sample included 646 articles. Spanish and German news had the most coverage of the euro crisis because the events of the crisis affected Spain and Germany more than they affected Britain and the United States. The results indicated that national economic policy influenced newspaper coverage of the euro crisis to an extent. However, the culture measures did not explain the observed differences in content, showing that attitudes of journalists toward the government in a specific news culture may not always affect content.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Even though the economy affects everyone, it is often through information outside of personal experience that people make sense of the big picture. News often fills this role, even for policy makers, which means news can have some effect on economic policy. The news can also reflect national culture, which also influences policy. Differences in policy and information in different countries can make it harder for countries to work together, which in the case of the European Union could determine whether the Union will still be around in the future or have to break up because of too many differences getting in the way of unified action. To address this issue, this thesis shows the connections among culture, news, and policy through a content analysis and comparison of German, Spanish, British, and American elite newspaper coverage of the euro crisis during significant weeks in 2011 and 2012.

While the web of influence just outlined can have consequences within an individual country in the global system, it can have another set of consequences when countries' economies are institutionally connected through common policy and currency, as is the case in the European Union. Differences in national interests of the individual member states, interests that economic policies and news coverage reflect, have had consequences in the handling of treaties and have threatened the Union itself.¹ The states maintain a degree of sovereignty. Nevertheless, they are still obligated to adhere to the economic and political treaties of the EU, although critics have said the lack of cohesive political action in the EU has had negative effects. Part of this lack of cohesion could stem from fear of Germany following World War II because the country has become the

¹ See Carlo Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

largest economy in Europe. A larger economy means Germany has more influence than others in making economic decisions for the European Union, as described later in this thesis. Too much real and perceived economic influence could renew fears that Germany is trying to take over Europe again, only this time through economic control rather than military power and invasion.

Even so, academics have found other causes for lack of unity in the European Union as well. Referring to lack of unity, German scholar Jürgen Habermas said, “[t]he financial, debt, and euro crises occurring in rapid succession have revealed the flaw in the construction of a gigantic economic and currency area which lacks the necessary instruments to conduct a joint economic policy.”² Lack of unity in national interests and policies, in many ways reflected and maintained by news coverage, has the potential to have economic effects because of how the EU works. It would be challenging to measure the direct effects of news coverage on economic policy because of all the variables that go into creating policy. Rather than measuring effects, this thesis will connect news coverage to economic policy and national culture by examining differences, if any, among German, Spanish, British, and American coverage of the euro crisis. Variables to measure policy and culture were defined and then coded for in news coverage to make the connections and draw conclusions about why the content was the way it was and what it could mean for Europe. By studying the content of news, scholars can understand the decisions in the production of the content and the possible implications of the content on

² Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 129.

the outside world.³ Such understandings allow researchers to make connections among concepts without measuring direct effects.

Because of connections among culture, economic policy, and news, there can be differences in news coverage when there are differences in culture and economic position. Germany, the biggest economy in the European Union, has played the role of the lender to weaker Eurozone countries in the past years. Other countries perceive Germany as trying to lead all of Europe. Spain's economy has not been doing as well and has needed outside help, putting it at the mercy of stronger countries. Britain is part of the European Union, but the euro crisis has affected the country differently because it does not use the euro. Despite not using the euro, the country still has some investment in EU policies. Britain has treated its membership to the EU as a free trade area rather than full union.⁴ Euroscepticism, which is criticism of the European Union and opposition to European integration, is also common within the British press.⁵ The United States would feel mostly global effects of the crisis in Europe and has little influence over what happens there compared to the other countries in this thesis. The differing positions in the crisis combined with events within the crisis have caused resentment between the countries receiving aid and the countries giving aid, at least among the public.⁶ These differences in position plus differences in national culture could give rise to differences in coverage, which would show a connection to differences in national sentiments and actions surrounding the crisis despite the unity of the EU.

³ Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content* (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers USA, 1996), 27-8.

⁴ P.W. Preston, *England after the Great Recession: Tracking the Political and Cultural Consequences of the Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 12.

⁵ Mick Temple, *The British Press* (Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2008), 194.

⁶ Thomas Mayer, *Europe's Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro* (New York: Anthem Press, 2012), 180.

Although academics studying the euro crisis have looked at the economic and political causes and implications, they say little about news coverage of the crisis and its possible implications. Because news coverage can reflect political and economic culture and have an effect on the nation's perceptions of politics and economics, it is useful to have a comparison of euro crisis news to supplement the work about political and economic differences. The international political and economic implications of the crisis make a comparison of news even more useful. This thesis fills part of this gap in the existing research through comparison of elite newspaper coverage during times of significant developments with the euro. The field needs an understanding of content across different countries,⁷ and this thesis helps fill that need. The findings of this thesis are based on the content analysis of 646 articles. The results show not only implications for the future of the EU, but also implications for this field of study. Differences in coverage can say something about the unity of the European Union. The results could also determine whether the common assumption that journalists' attitudes affect content holds true in this context.

⁷ Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, "Comparing Media Systems: A Response to Critics," in *Handbook of Comparative Communication Research*, eds. Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch (London: Routledge, 2012), 218.

Chapter 2: Crisis Background and Problems with Unity

What the euro crisis is should be clear before exploring the background of the euro crisis. For the purpose of this thesis, the euro crisis is the economic hardship following the sovereign debt, banking, and fiscal crises in the Eurozone countries, which first started to reveal themselves during the 2007-2010 global financial crisis.⁸ The term as I use it includes any economic action taken within the Eurozone to address any economic issues related to the crisis, like unemployment or interest rates. The interconnection among countries in the European Union makes concerns over the euro and national economic concerns very much related. Because of the interconnection among countries, euro crisis coverage also includes stories about just one Eurozone country's economy.

Imbalances in the System

The euro seemed promising when it came into use in 1999.⁹ The currency aided growth in Greece, Ireland, and Spain while developing a reputation of low inflation and low interest rates.¹⁰ However, the global financial crisis changed all that. In Europe, the crisis intensified existing imbalances. Movement of currency has become increasingly uneven because of trade imbalances. Scholars note this movement as a source of imbalance because euros can travel across borders in the Eurozone more easily than currencies valid in only one nation can travel across borders. While trade imbalances are common in the global economy, the relatively easy movement of currency between

⁸ Patrick O'Callaghan, "Collective Memory in Law and Policy: The Problem of the Sovereign Debt Crisis." *Legal Studies* 32 (December 2012): 643.

⁹ Dermot Hodson, *Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31.

¹⁰ Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 90.

countries within the common currency area have furthered imbalances in the European system.¹¹

National economic actions contributed to these imbalances. Part of what led to the uneven buildup of debt was that some member states were not following the EU budget rules.¹² Even Germany, the country that pushed for stringent rules, was running a deficit above the maximum limit, which made other countries less inclined to control their own deficits.¹³ Attempts to rescue banks turned private debts into public ones in some countries, leading to an uneven buildup of national debt.¹⁴

Banks furthered the imbalance by spooking easily. When the European Central Bank stopped buying bonds financing Greek and Portuguese national debt to reduce risk, other banks sold off bonds from similar countries, like Italy and Spain, also to reduce risk, which spread the economic downturn to the other countries because the money flow slowed.¹⁵ Such a situation shows how single risks affect the whole system in an interdependent system like the EU in that banks considered Spain and Italy as risky even though they were in a better situation than Greece.¹⁶ The resulting downgrades in certain countries' credit ratings created further imbalances in the Eurozone.¹⁷

The economic imbalances in the euro crisis are not new. An inflationary situation similar to the euro crisis played out in the early 1990s as Europe was preparing for the common currency and a full economic and monetary union. The countries affected by

¹¹ Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 93.

¹² *Ibid.*, 78.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹⁴ O'Callaghan, "Collective Memory in Law and Policy," 644.

¹⁵ Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 269.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 313-4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 95.

the inflation were Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.¹⁸ France and Germany also had higher deficits than usual during this time, which caused other countries to put less effort into reducing their government deficits.¹⁹

Austerity Measures and Founding National Interests

Austerity measures and national policy preferences that influenced the founding treaties also caused imbalances in the Eurozone economies. In light of the economic conditions around 2010, the European Union leaned toward adopting austerity standards much like the ones already in place in Germany.²⁰ However, some scholars have pointed out that such action would fix only problems caused by overspending and not those caused by other factors.²¹ Even the countries in this study have had economic difficulties for different reasons. Germany relied on exports and ran a surplus that companies invested abroad, leading to reliance on other countries' economies, while Britain had a strong financial sector that led to riskier bank actions. Spain tried to catch up to the rest of the EU while ignoring credit bubbles.²² Because of the different causes of economic slowdown, austerity would affect each country differently.

The treaties that built the European Union favored some members' national interests over others. These founding treaties, which European leaders created and signed over several decades, maintain a degree of economic and political unity by restraining members of the community from acting too independently.²³ However, that does not mean members of the community had equal say in the treaties. The European Monetary

¹⁸ Malcolm Townsend, *The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union* (London: John Harper Publishing, 2007), 85.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 85.

²⁰ O'Callaghan, "Collective Memory in Law and Policy," 645.

²¹ Robert Boyer, "The Four Fallacies of Contemporary Austerity Policies: The Lost Keynesian Legacy," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 36 (2012): 301.

²² Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 80.

²³ Townsend, *The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union*, 2.

Union's institutional design predominantly considered German interests because Germany had the largest population and the most to lose. The German influence is why anti-inflationary policies, conditions to encourage stability of the euro, limits on government borrowing, and prohibition of financing member state debts became part of the treaty.²⁴ Germany was also behind the no bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty,²⁵ which explains the country's reluctance to help failing neighbors within the Union during the euro crisis. However, there have been ways to bypass the no bailout rule. A Regional Fund has been in place to help new members catch up to the community.²⁶ The treaty did not rule out fiscal assistance to countries outside the euro area, an exception some leaders have argued should allow for bailouts of countries within the Eurozone.²⁷

As noted earlier, a lack of unity in actions and policies has caused economic imbalances in the EU. Politicians and populations of the member states have not adjusted to unity. National issues are still more important than European ones in elections within the member states, which is why unity difficulties intensified.²⁸ A study of news coverage of European issues in Danish, Dutch, and British news in the first years of the euro showed the lack of unity in news content. Coverage of Europe was a focus only when a European event happened, like a political summit or a European parliamentary election, but was almost nonexistent before or after the event.²⁹ Even when there was

²⁴ Hodson, *Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad*, 6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁶ Townsend, *The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union*, 13.

²⁷ Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 96.

²⁸ Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union*, 134.

²⁹ Claes H. de Vreese, " 'Europe' in the News: A Cross-National Comparative Study of the News Coverage of Key EU Events," *European Union Politics* 2 (2001), 283.

coverage of the European Union, national spin and interests influenced how news sources covered the European Union.³⁰

National Differences in Crisis Management: Germany, Spain, Britain, and the USA

Policy can counter times of economic hardship. Policies can encourage a government deficit to combat recession or slow economic growth by reducing the deficit.³¹ It is in making these decisions that differences appeared among the countries researched in this thesis. Britain and Germany have two of the biggest economies in the European Union. What has affected unity in the EU is that these two countries do not agree on policy, which makes having a common strategy difficult.³² The monetary policies of the European Union lean toward German austerity preferences because of the performance of the mark before the introduction of the euro; however, other countries are skeptical.³³ Much of Europe has been critical of German ability to lead Europe. Much of the criticism has stemmed from German concerns that ailing countries would default on German loans. The German government has tried to avoid losing money loaned to other countries by adding strict austerity conditions, which has led to political disagreements and German resistance to offering economic help to other countries.³⁴

One example of national differences arose when some leaders suggested the idea of fiscal stimulus as a solution for Greece in 2010. Britain called for a fiscal stimulus in Greece while Germany refused.³⁵ The United States also advocated a stimulus in Europe.³⁶ Germany's reluctance to do a fiscal stimulus was not in keeping with its strong

³⁰ De Vreese, "Europe' in the News," 300.

³¹ Townsend, *The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union*, 24.

³² Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 75.

³³ *Ibid.*, 75.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 279.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 77.

economic profile because other countries with strong economies were more apt to use a stimulus for recovery.³⁷ Demographic changes within the country could explain part of the German reluctance. Germany's population is aging. Not enough young people are working in the country to keep the social welfare system afloat. One response to the economic hardship has been for the Germans to increase spending on education but cut wherever possible elsewhere to ensure they have high-earning workers paying into the social welfare system in the future to prevent collapse.³⁸ Higher-earning workers would offset the decrease in the number of workers. Growth in population is likely to happen only with an increase in immigration, which is not popular because immigration integration has not worked as expected.³⁹ Even generations later, descendants of guest workers have had troubles becoming part of German society. The Germans were also nervous about a repeat of the Transferunion, which is the evening out of economic disparities between the eastern and western German states since the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, but on a European scale and without a fixed timetable.⁴⁰ Germany would have to give more financial aid than other countries.⁴¹

Although Spain has gotten some attention in the news because of bad economic conditions and resistance to the austerity measures, Greece has been a focus of news about the euro stimulus and of meetings between European leaders. The handling of Greece and other struggling countries has intensified national differences within the EU. The initial decision of how to proceed in Greece established how the Union would proceed with other struggling nations, like Spain. There was a lack of cooperation

³⁷ Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 74.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 84.

leading up to the first bailout in Greece. The Germans wanted to make a plan before acting in Greece, but others involved did not and wanted to push the details off until later.⁴² The Germans wanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) involved to lessen the consequences on all the member states of Europe. Others did not want the IMF involved because then Americans would control what is happening in Greece, something the Germans said was already happening to a degree because of the United States' economic power.⁴³ This time of butting heads was a low point in the crisis for the EU; no one was sure what would happen. In 2010, the EU looked as if it would collapse. Anti-Europeans, particularly in Britain, tried to make collapse happen faster and called for referendums, court cases in Germany questioned the legality of the union's actions in Greece, and polarized parties throughout Europe increased power.⁴⁴ Having struggling countries, like Spain, leave the Eurozone, having Germany leave, and reducing the Eurozone to Northern Europe only were all options at this time.⁴⁵

Although economic actions and policy formations have seemed to calm down since, Europe is struggling. Spain went into a recession in 2012. The country required outside help and unpopular budget reforms, a development that led to other European leaders blaming German policymakers for wanting too much reform too fast.⁴⁶

Unemployment in Spain has also remained high, which has led to protests.⁴⁷

⁴² Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 167.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁴⁴ Preston, *England after the Great Recession*, 67.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁴⁶ Mayer, *Europe's Unfinished Currency*, 181.

⁴⁷ PBS NewsHour, "Greeks March Against Austerity Measures," *PBS Newshour* video, 6:28, September 26, 2012, accessed November 30, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/greece2_09-26.html

Review of Research

Below is a chart of research dealing with differences in news and culture in the countries included in this thesis. Some studies compare two or more of the countries in this thesis. Others only have information about one of the four countries in the thesis. The table organizes the studies in the order they appear in the review of research. The columns indicate which of the four countries the studies cover.

Figure 2-1: Chart of Comparative research

Study/Country	United States	Britain	Germany	Spain
Esser 1999		X	X	
Hanitzsch 2011	X		X	X
Hanitzsch and Berganza 2012	X		X	X
Hanitzsch and Mellado 2011	X		X	X
Janssen et al. 2008	X		X	
Kolmer and Semetko 2009	X	X	X	
Esser 2008	X	X	X	
Hallin and Mancini 2004	X	X	X	X
Egido 2010				X
Benson et al. 2012	X			
Esser 2013	X	X	X	
Van Dalen 2012		X	X	X

News Culture

News culture has roots in cultural norms of expression and communication style. In addition to reflecting the culture of a place, news culture is also a reflection of the role of journalism in a society. For example, a common division in news cultures is between tabloid and informational news. The purpose of tabloid news is to entertain the reader, which benefits the reader alone, whereas the purpose of informational news is to inform the reader, which can be beneficial to society. The two overlap to different degrees in

different places, as studies of tabloidization of political news show. One study found that tabloid journalism was not as strong in Germany as in Britain.⁴⁸ The study focused on the role of preferences in the tabloidization of news, although other societal factors could also play a role. The types of stories readers preferred and the methods journalists used in Germany all indicated a skew toward traditional, informative journalism over tabloidization. The study also found that German journalists value intellectual information more than entertainment, which is part of why there are comparatively more non-tabloid news stories in Germany than in Britain.

Surveys of journalists' attitudes have also found differences among news cultures in different countries. Scholars have approached the study of differences among journalists of different nationalities from a variety of angles. Studies determined which professional roles,⁴⁹ influences on journalists' trust in public institutions,⁵⁰ and influences on content⁵¹ are most prevalent in different countries.

Professional roles are important to news culture because they show how media workers view the place of journalists and news in society. The professional roles Hanitzsch studied included populist disseminator, detached watchdog, critical change agent, and opportunist facilitator. Populist disseminators produce interesting content that attracts a wide audience. The populist disseminator role requires the journalist to remain

⁴⁸ Frank Esser, "'Tabloidization' of News A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and German Press Journalism," *European Journal of Communication* 14, no. 3 (1999), 296.

⁴⁹ Thomas Hanitzsch, "Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus, the Journalistic Field and Autonomy in 18 Countries," *International Communication Gazette* 73, no. 6 (2011), 477.

⁵⁰ Thomas Hanitzsch and Rosa Berganza, "Explaining Journalists' Trust in Public Institutions Across 20 Countries: Media Freedom, Corruption, and Ownership Matter Most," *Journal of Communication* 62, no. 5 (2012), 794.

⁵¹ Thomas Hanitzsch and Claudia Mellado, "What shapes the news around the world? How journalists in eighteen countries perceive influences on their work," *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 16, no. 3 (2011), 404.

an observer in the reporting and not a participant. Detached watchdogs work as critical, unbiased observers. Critical change agents are also critical but try to influence the public directly with their work. Opportunist facilitators use the content they produce to further the government's interests.⁵²

Below is a table of the distribution of professional roles in the study above. In the United States, the detached watchdog role was the most prevalent, followed by critical change agent, populist disseminator, and opportunist facilitator. In Germany, the detached watchdog role was also most prevalent, followed by populist disseminator, critical change agent, and opportunist facilitator. Spanish journalists were mostly populist disseminators, followed by detached watchdogs and opportunist facilitators being almost even in percentage. Critical change agents were the least prevalent in the Spanish sample compared to the other milieus. The results show that journalists in the United States and Germany are similar in trying to separate the news from the government while the Spanish journalists are less likely to do so. Such attitudes affect how journalists handle political and economic news, which could cause differences in content.

Table 2-1: Results from Hanitzsch 2011⁵³

	Germany	United States	Spain	Britain
Detached Watchdog	69%	64%	25%	N/A
Populist Disseminator	16%	11%	39%	N/A
Critical Change Agent	10%	21%	12%	N/A
Opportunist Facilitator	4%	4%	24%	N/A

⁵² Hanitzsch, "Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus," 484-6.

⁵³ Ibid., 487.

Trust in the institutions of a society is also part of news culture and can come through in content. Mutual distrust between politicians and journalists could transfer to news coverage. The distrust can affect the information politicians share with journalists. Distrust can also show itself in how journalists present political information in coverage, which can affect public trust. Hanitzsch and Berganza found that political performance, ownership of the media, and interpersonal trust within a society had the greatest influence on journalists' institutional trust.⁵⁴ Power distance between journalists and people in power, or whether the media were a watchdog in a given country, and journalistic culture had less influence on institutional trust. There was typically less institutional trust in places with more democracy, possibly because journalists could be watchdogs and share critical information about the government. The biggest differences in trust were between countries, not between news organizations within them. The differences between Germany and the United States were small in the variables studied, but the Germans had greater institutional trust than the Americans did. Spanish journalists had less institutional trust than the Germans but more than the Americans did. Personal trust and power distance were much lower in Spain than in Germany or the United States.

There are other influences on content in addition to trust. Content influences include political, economic, organizational, professional, procedural, and reference group influences.⁵⁵ Political influences included influences from officials and policy. Economic influences had to do with the market, advertising, and profits. Organizational influences referred to the editorial decisions and management of the newsroom and news organization. Procedural influences included time and resource constraints as well as

⁵⁴ Hanitzsch and Berganza, "Explaining Journalists' Trust in Public Institutions," 802.

⁵⁵ Hanitzsch and Mellado, "What shapes the news around the world?" 406-7.

journalistic standards. Professional influences were policies and media law. Reference groups were colleagues, audiences, and personal connections. The journalists in the survey perceived procedural, professional, and organizational influences to be most important overall while rating economic and political as the least important. German journalists considered all influences less significant than the American ones did. The Spanish participants viewed political and economic factors as more influential than their American and German counterparts did,⁵⁶ which their role perception of working as a companion to the government rather than separately can explain.

This body of research on news culture shows through surveys that cultural influences affect journalists. The cultural influences affect role perceptions, trust in institutions, and content. Even though this thesis relies on content analysis rather than surveys, the results of surveys give information about possible cultural influences on content. For example, the role perceptions show that Spanish journalists are more likely to support the government agenda. German and American journalists are more likely to consider themselves watchdogs and be critical of the government agenda. Content analysis will show whether journalists demonstrate their perceived influences in content.

News

News Content

Comparisons of coverage of specific genres or events have shown differences among countries in news content. For example, Janssen et al.'s content analysis of arts journalism in Dutch, French, German, and American prestige press between 1955 and 2005 revealed some interesting differences. Dutch and German newspapers had more

⁵⁶ Hanitzsch and Mellado, "What shapes the news around the world?" 414-6.

international arts coverage and increased this international coverage over the years.⁵⁷

The trend most likely happened because the two countries were not central figures in the global arts scene as France and the United States were, so many of the major stories had to be international. Only the United States did not increase international focus over time. While these results do not deal with the euro crisis, they do show that the more prominent countries in an area of social life, in this case the arts, are more likely to focus on themselves than look to other countries. A national focus in prominent countries may also be true in economic reporting. How journalists cover war can also differ by nationality, as found in Kolmer and Semetko's study of television coverage of the "official" three to four-week war in Iraq in 2003 in six countries. The approaches in reporting were substantially different in countries less supportive of the war, like Germany, compared to reporting in countries more involved in the war, like the United States. For example, the Germans did not use embedded journalists because of military propaganda concerns. German journalists also reported more on subjects like the role of journalists in the war, the politics at play, the role of the UN and other third parties, and problems faced by civilians. The American coverage, on the other hand, focused more on military actions. American coverage was also three times more likely to use a positive spin in stories about the Allies than German news organizations. The British results fell in between the German and American ones.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Susanne Janssen et al., "Cultural Globalization and Arts Journalism: The International Orientation of Arts and Culture Coverage in Dutch, French, German and U.S. Newspapers, 1955 to 2005," *American Sociological Review* 73 (2008), 719.

⁵⁸ Christian Kolmer and Holli A. Semetko, "Framing the Iraq War Perspectives from American, UK, Czech, German, South African, and Al-Jazeera News." *American Behavioral Scientist* 52, no. 5 (2009), 646-8, 653-4.

Research into sound and image bites in French, German, British, and American news also found national differences in content.⁵⁹ German newscasts had the least political coverage on newscasts due to the separate, politically specialized programs that are prevalent in Germany. The British newscasts had the most political coverage. American newscasts had the shortest sound bites. Britain and Germany had the most reporter narration in relation to sound bites while France had the least. Reporter narration presumably takes away time from the politician in the sound bite, which means public officials can speak for themselves more in France than in Britain or Germany. Attack rhetoric was a main feature of American news whereas campaigning was more dominant in other countries. The results showed that the French were the least interventionist and Americans the most. These differences hint even more at differences in attitudes in different countries affecting news content.

News Development: Models of Media Systems

Studies dealing with models of media systems have connected culture to news and regional trends in media system development. Hallin and Mancini compared systems in different countries based on media markets, links between media and politics, journalistic development, and state intervention to come up with three main regional models.⁶⁰ The model of southern European countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and to an extent France is the “polarized pluralism” model. The countries in this group have many distinct political parties that cover the entire political spectrum.⁶¹ Politicians and the

⁵⁹ Frank Esser, “Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States,” *Press/Politics* 13 (2008), 422-3.

⁶⁰ Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 130.

media are very connected because elites are the target audience for newspapers.⁶² These countries' media systems evolved in similar ways, with most having roots in opinion press and dictatorship.⁶³ They also had the tendency to have a partisan press but not necessarily a party press.⁶⁴ Compared to other regions, this group exhibited less professional development among journalists, although that does not mean they are not educated.⁶⁵ Egido had similar findings about Spanish journalism in particular. He pointed out that language used in economic news in Spain is very rooted in social values and ideology⁶⁶ and is not always politically neutral because of a more partisan press,⁶⁷ reflecting parts of Spain's culture.

The liberal model is present in Britain, Ireland, Canada, and the United States. According to the researchers, the model's traits include limited government, individualism, commercialism, and emphasis on "objectivity" in news. However, Britain is more continental because of its partisan press.⁶⁸ These countries are connected less by geographical region than the other groups in the study and more by use of the English language.⁶⁹

Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the German-speaking countries make up the "democratic corporatist" group.⁷⁰ This group is something between the liberal and polarized pluralist models because its characteristics include both commercial and party press. These countries also have a wide spectrum of political

⁶² Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 133.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶⁶ José Joaquín Martínez Egido, "Ideología en el Lenguaje Económico de la Prensa Española Actual: Recursos Lingüísticos y Pragmáticos en las Noticias Económicas," *Lea* 32 (2010): 124.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁶⁸ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246-7.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 246.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.

parties, press freedom, and some state intervention.⁷¹ State help for the “common good” and strong welfare systems that encourage a degree of collectivity are prominent in these countries.⁷²

The researchers speculated that all of the models are gradually homogenizing and becoming more liberal due to globalization.⁷³ However, a more recent study found that the models have continued their differences online.⁷⁴ The findings showed the move from print to online did not change content much in the French polarized pluralist model. However, news sites in the American liberal model feature more advertising, opinion, and fluffy local news. The Danish democratic corporatist news sites showed mixed results, illustrating the model’s similarities to the other two models. The study shows the models Hallin and Mancini wrote about can explain trends, but their speculations about homogenization may not apply.

Content analysis of political coverage in American, British, German, Swiss, and Italian newspapers offered more model variation than Hallin and Mancini’s study did. The content analysis found that the United States had a clear model that emphasized “rational news analysis.” The Italian model was clearly polarized, and the German model heavily mixed news and opinion. These countries closely represented Hallin and Mancini’s models. The other countries fell somewhere between the other models. British news in some ways was very close to the American and German models. The Swiss news was very close to the German model. The French news was in some ways somewhere between the Italian and German. The French and British models were

⁷¹ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 195-6.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 197.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 247-8.

⁷⁴ Rodney Benson et al., “Media Systems Online and Off: Comparing the Form of News in the United States, Denmark, and France,” *Journal of Communication* 62 (2012) 32-4.

hardest to place in relation to other countries.⁷⁵ The American papers were most objective followed by the Germans while the Italian papers were the least.⁷⁶ The German and Swiss papers were the least negative and the French and Italian ones were the most.⁷⁷ The American reporting tended to include expert opinions more than others did, leading to more “rational analysis” while the German and Swiss papers had less analytical news but more prominent opinion pieces.⁷⁸

Models of media systems are also very closely related to news cultures. Research has shown that attitudes of journalists toward their roles can influence reporting styles and interpretations of the role of journalism. Another study worked under the assumption that Spain had a polarized pluralist model, Britain a liberal model, and Germany and Denmark a democratic corporatist model, in keeping with Hallin and Mancini’s findings.⁷⁹ The results revealed how the models affected attitudes toward politics. The Spanish journalists believed politics were newsworthy just for being politics. Danish journalists were much like the Spanish in attitude but not in content. The British and German journalists were least likely to believe politics were newsworthy just for being politics. British journalists valued entertainment and scandals more than the others did. The Spanish journalists were more partisan than the others were.⁸⁰

This body of research on media models and news content shows differences in content and attitudes based on historical development of news systems. The patterns

⁷⁵ Frank Esser, “Competing Models of Journalism? Political Affairs Coverage in U.S., British, German, Swiss, French and Italian Newspapers,” (Working Paper No. 55, National Center of Competence in Research: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, February 2013) 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁹ Arjen van Dalen et al., “Different Roles, Different Content? A Four-Country Comparison of the Role Conceptions and Reporting Style of Political Journalists,” *Journalism* 13 (2012), 909-10.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 912, 914.

found in this research give insight into the relationship among cultural and national differences, news production practices, and news content. Such connections give a good background for the examination of the connections among culture, economic policy, and news content in this thesis.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

While all this information from previous research about linguistic choices, journalist attitudes, and content of newspapers and television broadcasts offers useful background, the studies more often deal with coverage of national issues or singular international events, like battles in a war or elections, than with ongoing international issues, like an economic crisis. The differences in the situation in this study as opposed to the existing research lead to the following questions:

RQ1: How were the newspapers studied different in terms of amount of coverage of the euro crisis? In other words, how many articles did each have on the subject during the specified time periods and how long were they?

RQ2: How was the focus of coverage different in each paper? Did certain topics get more attention than others did?

In addition to finding basic differences in news content, the goal of this thesis is to explore connections among national culture, news coverage, and economic policy decisions.

For the economic policy measure, the demonstrated government stance on austerity and bailouts for struggling countries determined the ranking for each nation. Articles about policy in *The New York Times* during the weeks in the study revealed the demonstrated stances. Measurements included only British, German, and Spanish

economic policies because American economic policy is different from policy in Europe. American policy also had no bearing on the euro crisis as policy in the other three countries did because the United States is not part of the EU. The articles gave insight as to what national leaders were saying about austerity and bailouts as well as what sorts of actions politicians were taking. National leaders accepting austerity or bailouts and putting austerity or bailout policies into use indicated a positive government stance toward austerity or bailouts. The opposite would demonstrate a negative government stance. The indicated stances determined whether a country's policies would support austerity or bailouts. For example, in terms of austerity, German policy favors austerity very much. *The New York Times* articles showed that politicians have been pushing for austerity for a while in Germany and more recently have pushed austerity in the rest of Europe.⁸¹ A country whose policies went against austerity would not show such support. Although British politicians encouraged fiscal stimulus in Greece in 2010,⁸² British policy is also favorable to austerity domestically. The government has been cutting spending to reduce its national deficit for a while.⁸³ Spanish policy has also reflected austerity measures in its national budget for 2013,⁸⁴ which was part of a series of measures taken to reduce the national deficit.⁸⁵ Spanish leaders have implemented austerity measures largely because of pressure from other European leaders. Many people in Spain have shown hostility toward the proposed austerity measures. German policy was most friendly toward austerity because German leaders have insisted on

⁸¹ Mark Landler and Nicholas Kulish, "In Euro Crisis, Obama Looks to Merkel," *The New York Times*, June 16, 2012, A4.

⁸² Bastasin, *Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro*, 76.

⁸³ Paul Krugman, "The Austerity Debacle," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2012, A23.

⁸⁴ Raphael Minder, "Despite Public Protests, Spain's 2013 Budget Plan Includes More Austerity," *The New York Times*, September 28, 2012, B6.

⁸⁵ Raphael Minder and David Jolly, "Spain Readies Budget for 2013," *The New York Times*, September 25, 2012.

austerity both domestically and in other countries. British policy was second in support of austerity because austerity measures were in place there and were implemented without outside pressure. Spanish policy was least friendly toward austerity because although austerity measures were in place, they only came after outside pressure.

In terms of bailouts to struggling countries, the Germans were consistently wary of giving aid and pushed austerity instead.⁸⁶ However, Britain was even more hostile toward the idea during the time period in this thesis and refused to take part in any bailouts in Greece.⁸⁷ Spain was the friendliest to bailouts because it needed one, although the Spanish prime minister consistently called the Spanish bailout a “line of credit.”⁸⁸ Perhaps the euphemism indicated less favor toward bailouts in Spain than would be expected had he not used a euphemism.⁸⁹ In this case, Spanish policy was the most supportive of bailouts because the country accepted one, although not overwhelmingly supportive because of the stigma associated with bailouts in Spain. German policy came next in support of bailouts because even though German politicians resisted, they still took part. British policy was most hostile toward bailouts because Britain refused to take part in any bailouts.

The following hypotheses show the expectations in ranking of policy within news coverage:

⁸⁶ Mark Landler and Nicholas Kulish, “In Euro Crisis, Obama Looks to Merkel,” *The New York Times*, June 16, 2012, A4.

James Kanter, “Europe Tries to Ease Concerns Over Rescue Plan for Banks,” *The New York Times*, September 27, 2012, B2.

James Kanter, “Bank Reform Hits Obstacle in Euro Zone,” *The New York Times*, September 16, 2012, A17.

⁸⁷ Stephen Castle, “Europeans Agree to a New Bailout for Greece with Conditions,” *The New York Times*, June 25, 2011, B3.

⁸⁸ Raphael Minder, “Spain’s Premier Steps up, with Caveats for Europe,” *The New York Times*, June 11, 2012, A3.

⁸⁹ Raphael Minder, Nicholas Kulish, and Paul Geitner, “Spain to Accept European Rescue for Ailing Banks,” *The New York Times*, June 10, 2012, A1.

H1a: If news content were to follow national economic policy trends, German news would be the most favorable toward austerity, followed by the British news, with Spanish news being the least favorable toward austerity.

H1b: If news content were to follow national economic policy trends, Spanish news would be the most favorable toward bailouts for struggling countries, followed by the German news, with British news being the least favorable toward bailouts.

One measure of culture related to news is the role of journalists. Many studies have investigated journalists' role perceptions in different countries. One clear divide among journalists of different cultures is whether they believe their role is to support the government or to act as a watchdog of the government. Such differences in role perceptions can affect news content.⁹⁰ A study of role perceptions across the world found that in both Germany and the United States, most journalists considered their role to be that of a watchdog by a significant margin.⁹¹ Only four percent of journalists in each country thought they should further the government agenda. In Spain, the differences between role perceptions were not as great, although significantly more Spanish journalists considered it their role to further government interests than German and American journalists did. The percentage of Spanish journalists who considered themselves watchdogs was essentially the same as the percentage that would further government interests. In a related study that measured how journalists perceived influences on their work, Spanish participants were more likely to find influences from

⁹⁰ Hanitzsch, "Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus," 482, 490.

⁹¹ Ibid., 487.

officials, policy, and the economics most important than their American and German counterparts were.⁹² The Spanish results relate to Spanish journalists' perceived roles in furthering government interests.

Studies of media system models are also in line with the findings about role perceptions and influences. Hallin and Mancini found that the model in Spain was very connected to politicians, whereas the American and British models were more commercial than political. The German model was a mixture of politics and commercialism.⁹³ One study that investigated role perceptions and content found that the Spanish journalists believed politics was newsworthy just for being politics and reflected this attitude in news content.⁹⁴ The British and German journalists and news content were very similar to each other. Both were also less likely to cover politics just for being politics.

Based on all of this information, the presence of support of a nation's government in news content would indicate cultural influence in terms of role perception. More specifically, the influence of role perception on content would show that journalists' attitudes affect the news. The international findings about government support in role perceptions lead to the following hypothesis:

H2: If journalistic roles are apparent in coverage, Spanish coverage will be the most likely to support the government, followed by German coverage, British coverage, and finally American coverage.

Culture also affects the amount of opinion in newspapers. Research about media models, surveys of journalists, and other connections between culture and news points

⁹² Hanitzsch and Mellado, "What shapes the news around the world?" 414.

⁹³ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

⁹⁴ Van Dalen et al., "Different Roles, Different Content?" 912.

out differences in the amount of opinion in different countries' newspapers. Hallin and Mancini said that Spanish news is rooted in opinion and partisan press. The German press also presents a lot of opinion. They also said the British and American press are similar in that they are less partisan and have less opinion.⁹⁵ The Hallin and Mancini study determined the ranking in H2 because the study was the only one to present all four countries. However, more limited studies found patterns consistent with Hallin and Mancini's findings. Esser found that American news did not have much opinion while German news had many prominent opinion pieces.⁹⁶ British news fell somewhere in between. Hanusch found that German news tends to focus more on opinion than British and American news.⁹⁷ Egado said that Spanish news commonly uses opinion because of the partisan press.⁹⁸ A ranking the countries by amount of opinion in the sample offers a second measure of the effects of culture on news content. The previous research on opinion in news leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: Based on the existing research about culture in news, Spain should have the most opinion in its sample, followed by Germany, then Britain, and finally the United States.


⁹⁵ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

⁹⁶ Esser, "Competing Models of Journalism?" 15.

⁹⁷ Hanusch, "A Product of their Culture," 620.

⁹⁸ Egado, "Ideología en el Lenguaje Económico de la Prensa Española Actual," 136.

Figure 2-2: Diagram of Relationships among Key Concepts in Hypotheses



A: Culture affects the news by influencing how journalists express ideas, which type of information delivery (e.g. strictly informative or more opinion-based) they prefer, and how journalists perceive their roles and influences on their work.

B: News can influence policy by affecting voter decisions and helping inform policy makers. Perhaps lack of focus on European issues in national media in the EU could partially explain problems with unity (see de Vreese 2001). Policy can also influence news by providing content when leaders enact or change policy, or when leaders use policy to make political decisions.

Chapter 3: Methods

Methodology

Content analysis was the best way to address the research questions and measure policy and culture indicators in news content. Content analysis allows for direct measurement of news content, which is one of the variables in this thesis. Content analysis is also more appropriate than other methods in this instance because the attitudes of journalists measured in surveys do not always match what appears in the content.⁹⁹ The results would determine whether the attitudes found in previous studies appear in the news content in this particular case. News content itself is important in the euro crisis because it can influence public opinion, which in turn could affect the future of the EU. The demonstrated stances in each newspaper give a better indicator of the ideas presented to readers than surveys of journalists would. The results will allow us to see how the content possibly reflects national news culture and economic policy.

Sample and Data Collection

This thesis examined four particularly eventful periods from 2011 and 2012. The focus fell on the fifteen months between Greece requesting a second bailout in June 2011 and major austerity protests in Southern Europe in September 2012. The first period examined was from June 17 through June 25, 2011. Greece requested a second bailout during this period. The second period spanned from January 27 until February 4, 2012, during which European leaders had to make economic decisions at an EU summit. The third period came from June 7-15, 2012 because of Spain requesting aid from the

⁹⁹ Van Dalen et al., "Different Roles, Different Content?" 913-4.

European Union during that time. September 14-28, 2012 made up the last period because of the austerity protests in Portugal, Spain, and Greece.

Newspaper coverage for each country came from well-studied elite newspapers. The Spanish coverage came from *El País*, the German from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the British from *The Times*, and the American from *The New York Times*. Each of these newspapers comes from the financial capital of its respective country, which makes this set of newspapers especially relevant for this thesis. Researchers consider elite newspapers better subjects than other papers for international comparison studies because of the influence and standard practices of the elite newspapers.¹⁰⁰

The newspapers were available electronically. *El País*, *The Times*, and *The New York Times* were all available on the LexisNexis Academic database. The search results within the database gave the page numbers from the physical newspaper for the articles that were not online only. The page numbers made it easy to pick out the articles that appeared in the print version of the newspaper, which is an ideal way of limiting the sample. Although some versions of LexisNexis carry the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the version of the database available to me at the time of writing this thesis did not have it, nor did the database have any other national German newspapers. Instead, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's* website provided the platform to find relevant articles. Interlibrary loan aided in finding the text of the articles because a subscription is required to view any article more than one month old on the website. The website's search results showed which section the article appeared in, like economics or politics. The sample included only articles filed under sections that appear in the print newspaper, which are the standard economics, politics, business, etc. The sample did not include

¹⁰⁰ Benson et al., "Media Systems Online and Off," 26.

articles from the *Rhein-Main* insert because they are specific to the area around Frankfurt. Those articles also do not necessarily appear in the print versions of the paper in other parts of Germany. While it was not possible to know for sure that all of the articles included in the sample appeared in the print newspaper, the sample more likely included articles that appeared in print because of the applied limitations.

The main purpose of this thesis was to explore connections among national news culture, economic policy, and content of the news. While the print versions were more likely the versions of the paper most people consumed, there was no way to be sure because of the attention shifting from print to online articles and news apps. Web-only articles would also show connections among culture, policy, and news content.

For the purpose of this study, euro crisis coverage included news about any steps leaders were taking to rescue Europe's economy. Euro crisis coverage also included steps ordinary people were taking to deal with the economy. Rescue steps could include meetings among EU and national leaders to discuss economic actions to take, the economic actions themselves, backlash following the meetings and actions, and general discussion of the fate of the euro. The articles about ordinary people dealt with how the people handled unemployment, lower wages, loss of pensions, and other economic effects of the crisis. Articles did not need to focus on the Eurozone as a whole to be included. Because the countries of Europe are so interconnected and their national economies directly affect the overall European economy, stories relating to national economies within the Eurozone were also part of the sample. To avoid including articles that only mentioned topics related to the euro crisis as a side note, there had to be a mention of the Eurozone economy, the economy of a country in the Eurozone, or the euro

crisis within the first three paragraphs of the article. An early mention made clear the article dealt with aspects of the crisis as more than a side note.

Coding and Analysis

To answer RQ1, the articles were coded for length. The number of articles was also be taken into account. Length was measured in character count, including spaces, but not including titles or bylines. Length measurements using character count can avoid inaccuracies due to different width of article space that would come about by counting lines. Because articles came from digital sources, they were copied and pasted into a Microsoft Word document to get the character count.

For RQ2, focus was the main topic of the article. To measure this, the article was coded for topic category. The coding included the following categories: human interest, austerity, bailouts, currency values, meetings between leaders, resistance, general economic effects, and miscellaneous. Human interest stories dealt with things like unemployment, education costs, consumer interests, and in general how individuals were dealing with the economic problems in their day-to-day lives. This category did not include stories about protests. The articles included only feature stories that typically started out with the personal story of an individual or small group. Articles dealing with austerity measures or cutbacks to government spending were in the austerity category. Any stories about economic stimulus, aid to other countries, and loans were in the bailouts category. Currency value stories included those about currency devaluation and exchange rates fluctuating between the euro and other currencies. Meetings between leaders included any event coverage of summits and economy-related leader visits to other countries. Resistance stories included those about protests and, if applicable,

national leaders refusing to follow EU policy. The general economic effects category included articles about businesses closing, banking issues, and other effects of the crisis. These stories were regular news articles and, unlike the human interest stories, did not include any feature stories about an individual or small group. Stories that dealt with the euro crisis but did not fit into any of the previous categories were miscellaneous. The coding accounted for only the principal topic. Headlines and leads gave clues to determine the principal topic if it was not clear from looking at the story holistically.

H1a and H1b deal with policy. These hypotheses had their own separate entries on the coding sheet. Having coding areas for austerity and bailouts independent from topic allowed for inclusion of articles with underlying stances on these subjects that were not principally about austerity or bailouts. Inclusion of such articles made it easier to determine overall stance on austerity and bailouts by increasing the sample size for the measure. Articles with direct mention of austerity measures or bailouts to struggling countries and what the policies were doing were coded for the presented stance. Merely mentioning the policies exist or giving details of what they are did not mean the article showed a stance. Effects or action had to be part of the story for there to be a stance. Anything that said that austerity or bailouts were not working or were harming Europe or a given country had a negative stance. Articles that said that austerity or bailouts were working or were helping Europe were positive in stance. Anything that presented a view balanced with positive and negative or did not have a clear stance despite giving details of what austerity or bailouts were doing was neutral. This measure included both the opinions present in the article and which facts journalists chose to include.

Culture was observed in the news from all four countries by measuring the demonstrated support for the government and the proportions of articles on news and opinion pages. Previous research pointed to these characteristics as part of culture in news. The category an article appeared in according to the search results determined whether an article appeared on a news or opinion page. If the article was under “opinion,” “editorial,” or an equivalent, it was coded as being on an opinion page. All other categories were considered news pages.

The measure of government support included opinions about the government within an article. The measure only included opinions, not the use of selected facts as in the policy measures. Only opinions counted in this measure to stay in line with the previous research on which the hypothesis was based. The previous research’s findings either came from measuring opinion or were not clear enough to determine whether the results came from opinion measurements or something broader, so measuring only the presented opinions made more sense in this case. These specifications restricted the content considered in news articles mostly to quotes in which interviewees offered their view about the government or any time the author presented a viewpoint instead of a fact. Opinion pieces were treated the same way so the facts included did not count for this measure, but the viewpoints did. Viewpoints that were critical of the government were not supportive. Positive viewpoints were supportive. A mixture of critical and positive or not leaning one way or another was neutral. This measure also only included stances toward the national government of each respective newspaper. Stances toward foreign governments were not part of the measurement because they were not part of the measurements in the existing research on which the hypothesis was based. Stance toward

the German government was only measured in the German coverage, stance toward the Spanish government was only measured in the Spanish coverage, and so on.

As described above, the coding schemes for H1a, H1b, and H2 were rather conservative. The measures avoided finding stance where there was no stance because they were very specific. The only stances included in the coding were stances toward austerity, bailouts, and the national government. Because of that, only a few articles in this thesis had a coded stance. Articles could have had a stance on other issues, like foreign governments or banking practices, but those stances were not part of the coding.

Interpretation of the patterns that arose from the results of the coding addressed the research questions and hypotheses. The total number of articles in each newspaper's sample, the total number of characters, and the average number of characters answered RQ1. The percentage of the total sample for each newspaper that dealt with each topic determined the proportions for each topic. The calculations included number of articles rather than number of characters. Proportions for each topic were compared based on relative size for each paper to determine which appeared the most. Differences between the proportions in each newspaper also provided answers to RQ2.

Comparison of the results for the hypotheses to the information and results of previous research revealed connections between news content, culture, and economic policy. The rankings in the hypotheses were compared to the proportions found in the analysis of news content based on the culture and policy measures. Frequencies and averages calculated for each category involved in the hypotheses revealed the proportions and skew for each newspaper. The results also created a "real" ranking to compare to the hypothesized one. The newspaper with the greatest skew as shown by the averages

toward positive policy stance, government support, or opinion had the largest positive policy stance, supportive government stance, or amount of opinion. The newspaper appeared in the “real” ranking accordingly. The next greatest skew toward positive policy stance, government support, and amount of opinion went next in the ranking, and so on. If the ranking matched the one in the hypothesis, the data supported the hypothesis. If the rankings did not match, the data did not support the hypothesis. The frequencies calculated for each hypothesis gave points of discussion by showing how often a stance was present versus no stance at all.

Intercoder reliability was calculated for the English-language samples from *The Times* and *The New York Times* with a second coder whose native language is English. The calculation ensured the measures used could produce similar results among different researchers. The second coder and I coded a random sample of 25 of the American and 25 of the British articles to determine intercoder reliability. Percent agreement and Cohen’s kappa are two common ways of calculating intercoder reliability in content analysis.¹⁰¹ This thesis presents calculations from both to be as accurate as possible because percent agreement can overestimate reliability while Cohen’s kappa tends to be more conservative.¹⁰² For both, the higher the results, the better the reliability.¹⁰³

The second coder coded the random sample for all of the measures. We discussed the coding scheme in depth before the second coder received the sample. The discussion included some examples to make sure everything was clear. Because the coding scheme

¹⁰¹ Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-Duch and Cheryl Campanella Bracken, “Practical Resources for Assessing and Reporting Intercoder Reliability in Content Analysis Research Projects,” *Matthew Lombard Intercoder Reliability*, last modified June 1, 2010, accessed January 10, 2014, <http://matthewlombard.com/reliability/>

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

was complex, I also gave the second coder a coding rule sheet to refer to while coding. The sheet included all of the coding details we discussed in person. The sheet was the same one I used while coding to ensure consistency. When the second coder was finished, we discussed the differences. We agreed on the correct coding of all disagreements that stemmed from uncertainty in the coding rules. The results below reflect the coding after this discussion. The differences that remained followed my coding in the results presented in the next chapter.

All of the length and opinion coding matched exactly. The other measures were more subjective and had varying degrees of reliability. The topic categories could overlap at times and in some situations were not very distinct. Percent agreement for the topic measure was 86 percent, while the Cohen's kappa result was 0.82. By both measures, intercoder reliability for topic was high. The austerity measure got 84 percent agreement but had a Cohen's kappa of 0.64. There are different interpretations of what is an acceptable Cohen's kappa, but according to a widely cited scale, the reliability for this measure was fairly good.¹⁰⁴ The bailout measure got 78 percent agreement and a Cohen's kappa of 0.50. The support measure had 90 percent agreement and a Cohen's kappa of 0.51. The reliability for these measures was moderate.¹⁰⁵ However, the high number of articles without a demonstrated stance brought down the Cohen's kappa results by making the probability of agreement by chance higher. The topic measure was varied enough for the probability of agreement by chance to be low, so the Cohen's kappa for topic stayed high.

¹⁰⁴ J. Richard Landis and Gary G. Koch, "The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data," *Biometrics* 33 (1977) 165.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 165.

This particular scale considers a Cohen's kappa of above 0.81 to be "almost perfect," 0.61-0.8 to be "substantial," and 0.41-0.6 to be "moderate."

Chapter 4: Results

Amount of Coverage and Topic

RQ1 dealt with the amount of coverage in each newspaper in terms of the number of articles and length. The findings are in Table 4-1. Spain had the most articles in the sample with 260 stories. Spain also had the highest total character count of 1,198,746 characters, including spaces, in the sample. Britain had the least coverage with only 100 articles and 368,590 characters including spaces. American coverage totaled 136 stories and 760,780 characters while German coverage yielded 150 stories and 803,510 characters. In terms of average story length, the United States had the longest articles with an average of 5,594 characters with spaces. Britain had the shortest articles overall with an average of 3,686 characters with spaces per article. The average German story was 5,357 characters long, and the average Spanish story was 4,611 characters long.

Perhaps Spain had the most coverage of the four countries because the crisis hit Spain harder than it hit the others. Britain may have had the least coverage and the shortest articles because the country was trying to distance itself from the EU. British coverage content showed active distancing from and criticism of the EU, which could explain why Britain had less coverage than the United States despite belonging to the EU.

Table 4-1: Amount of Coverage

Country	Total Number of Articles (N=646)	Total Characters	Average Story Length
Spain	260	1,198,746	4,611
Germany	150	803,510	5,357
Britain	100	368,590	3,686
United States	136	760,780	5,594

RQ2 addressed which topics received the most attention. Table 4-2 shows the frequency of each topic in each newspaper. General effects stories were consistently the

most frequent in each newspaper. However, trends in focus within the miscellaneous and general effects categories revealed the subcategories shown in Table 4-3, which provided better comparison. These subcategories were useful in comparing which types of general effects stories each paper used. The subcategories also pulled out any topics that were not part of the original coding and ended up in the miscellaneous category. The subcategories did not affect the other topic categories, just the general effects and miscellaneous categories. Many of the subcategories had to do with finance or business.

Table 4-2: Topic Distribution (% total coverage rounded to nearest whole percent)

	Spain	Germany	Britain	United States
General Effects	31%	29%	43%	30%
Bailouts	22%	29%	18%	24%
Miscellaneous	19%	13%	9%	16%
Meetings	10%	13%	15%	10%
Austerity	8%	4%	7%	7%
Human Interest	4%	5%	2%	9%
Resistance	6%	4%	2%	5%
Currency Values	0%	2%	4%	0%
<i>Total Number of Articles</i>	260	150	100	136

Table 4-3: Subcategories in the general effects and miscellaneous categories (% total coverage rounded to nearest whole percent)

	Spain	Germany	Britain	United States
Other Societal Effects	19%	12%	24%	7%
Unique Topic	13%	7%	8%	11%
Market Effects	4%	9%	7%	15%
Banking	8%	5%	6%	6%
Business Effects	1%	1%	7%	1%
Overview	5%	5%	0%	2%
Credit Ratings	1%	3%	0%	1%
Historical Comparison	0%	1%	0%	2%
<i>Total Number of Articles</i>	131	64	52	63

Stories within the banking subcategory focused on what local and national banks, as well as the European Central Bank, were doing to deal with the crisis. Credit rating stories dealt with the credit ratings of countries changing. Market effects stories had to do with the effects of the crisis on stocks, bonds, and investments. Overview stories focused on the background of the crisis or gave general information about the crisis within Europe as a whole or within a certain country. Historical comparison stories focused on comparing the current situation to another situation in the near or distant past. Some compared the Greek situation to the Lehman Brothers or the euro crisis to the Great Depression. Business effects stories included stories about businesses closing or the effects of the crisis on how people run businesses. The “other societal effects” subcategory included stories that did not fit into the other subcategories but dealt with societal effects of the crisis. Any stories that still did not fit into any of the subcategories were re-coded as part of the “unique topic” subcategory. The stories that were coded as “unique topic” stories had no common denominator, which meant they could not form additional, more specific subcategories.

Taking all of the categories and subcategories into account, a few were particularly frequent across all newspapers. Bailout stories were prominent in all of the newspapers, showing the importance of the bailouts in the crisis. Such stories were the most prominent category in all but *The Times*, in which the “other societal effects” subcategory was the most frequent. The “other societal effects” subcategory was frequent in the three European newspapers but not in the American one. The frequency of the “other societal effects” showed that stories about effects outside of finance and business were more popular overall in the European newspapers. Stories about finance

and business wound up in the other subcategories. The prevalence of the “unique topic” subcategory, although difficult to compare among countries because each individual story in the category was the only one of its kind, shows the difference in perspective of each newspaper. The subcategory was a bit larger than the other more specific subcategories but had relatively low percentages compared to the overarching category results.

Meetings stories were also among the most frequent in all of the newspapers. The slight differences in topic proportion also revealed some differences between countries. Market effects, historical comparison, and human interest stories were more prominent in the United States than in the other countries. Business effects and meetings stories were more frequent in Britain than in the others. The German newspaper had more frequent bailout and less frequent austerity stories than the others did. Resistance stories were slightly more frequent in the Spanish newspaper than in the others. The Spanish paper also had a higher proportion of banking stories than the others did.

Despite the differences in topic distribution across newspapers, the distributions were often very similar. The overall similarity of topic distribution could show that decisions of which topics to cover were dictated more than economic reality and events than by cultural or political differences.

Policy in the News

H1a and H1b dealt with policy and news, saying that the stance toward austerity and bailouts in economic policy in each country would predict the stance shown in the different newspapers. H1a stated that because Germany’s economic policy was most friendly to austerity, its newspaper coverage would be too. Britain was in the middle, and

Spain was supposed to be the most negative. The results supported this hypothesis, as seen in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4: Austerity in the News

Country	Austerity Policy Description	Average Austerity Stance in the News*
Germany	Main supporter of austerity in the EU, has domestic austerity policies and encourages other countries to adopt austerity as well ¹⁰⁶	2.47 (2=neutral) (N with stance=15)
Britain	Has domestic austerity policies ¹⁰⁷	1.50 (N with stance=26)
Spain	Has adopted austerity policies with encouragement from the EU ¹⁰⁸	1.32 (N with stance=75)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward austerity. Those that did not show a stance were not included in the calculation.

Table 4-5: Frequency of Austerity Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole percent)

Country	No Austerity Stance Shown	Negative	Neutral/Balanced	Positive
Germany	90%	0%	5%	5%
Britain	74%	16%	7%	3%
Spain	71%	21%	7%	1%
<i>Total Number of Articles in Each Category</i>	394	70	33	13

The German coverage was very positive toward austerity, reflecting German economic policy. Both the British and Spanish coverage skewed negative, with Spanish being slightly more negative. The frequency of each stance seen in Table 4-5 also offers some insight. As expected, most articles in the sample did not show a stance toward austerity. The German coverage was least likely to have a stance on austerity, while Spanish coverage was most likely. German coverage had no stories with a negative

¹⁰⁶ Landler and Kulish, "In Euro Crisis, Obama Looks to Merkel."

¹⁰⁷ Krugman, "The Austerity Debacle."

¹⁰⁸ Minder, "Despite Public Protests, Spain's 2013 Budget Plan Includes More Austerity."

stance but had a positive stance more frequently in comparison to the other newspapers. Five percent of German stories were positive. Spanish coverage showed the inverse, with a positive stance in only one percent of the coverage and a negative one in 21 percent of the coverage.

H1b had to do with stance on bailouts. The hypothesis stated that Spanish coverage would be most friendly and British coverage would be least, with German coverage in the middle. The results did not support this hypothesis.

Table 4-6: Bailouts in the News

Country	Bailout Policy Description	Average Bailout Stance in the News*
Spain	Recipient of bailout funds, some stigma attached to term “bailout” ¹⁰⁹	1.97 (2=neutral) (N with stance=71)
Britain	Refused to take part in bailouts in the EU ¹¹⁰	1.86 (N with stance=29)
Germany	One of the larger lenders in EU bailouts, insists on attaching austerity measures to terms of the loans ¹¹¹	1.62 (N with stance=45)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward bailouts. Those that did not show a stance were not included in the calculation.

Based on the average stance of the articles that showed a stance toward bailouts in Table 4-6, Spanish coverage was the friendliest toward bailouts. However, the Spanish stance still was not positive. Perhaps this means the Spanish result represented a combination of stigma toward and a need for bailouts. Spain’s average was slightly below a neutral stance at 1.97. Germany’s average was closest to a negative skew, although not drastically so, at 1.62. Britain’s average was in the middle at 1.86, which did not reflect the animosity British politicians demonstrated towards bailouts. The

¹⁰⁹ Minder, “Spain’s Premier Steps up, with Caveats for Europe.”

¹¹⁰ Castle, “Europeans Agree to a New Bailout for Greece with Conditions.”

¹¹¹ Landler and Kulish, “In Euro Crisis, Obama Looks to Merkel.”

overall neutrality toward bailouts was unexpected, although it could reflect a recognition of the potential for bailouts to help countries with excessive debt.

The frequencies in Table 4-7 show that Spanish coverage was the least likely to demonstrate a stance. German coverage was most likely to show stance, although the differences were very small at only three percent. Spain had the most frequent positive and least frequent negative stories of all three countries, with six percent negative coverage and five percent positive. German coverage showed the inverse, with 13 percent negative coverage and two percent positive coverage. These results show the opposing viewpoints on bailouts in Spain and Germany.

Table 4-7: Frequency of Bailout Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole percent)

Country	No Bailout Stance Shown	Negative	Neutral/Balanced	Positive
Spain	73%	6%	16%	5%
Britain	71%	7%	19%	3%
Germany	70%	13%	15%	2%
<i>Total Number of Articles in Each Category</i>	365	43	82	20

Culture in the News

H2 and H3 had to do with the effect of culture on news coverage. H2 dealt with government support in the news. According to the previous research, Spanish coverage should have shown the most government support, followed by Germany and Britain. The United States was supposed to have the least government support. The results did not support this hypothesis.

The German and British average stance toward national government in the news was very close, although their order was the same as that in the hypothesis (see Table 4-8). However, the United States and Spain were the opposite of what the hypothesis

stated. Spanish coverage was the least supportive, with an average of 1.84, while American was the most, with an average of 2.29. The rather positive skew of American content and almost neutral skew of Spanish content did not reflect the role perceptions Hanitzsch found. The averages could have been affected by the subject matter of the coverage. Spain was struggling while the United States was further removed from the crisis, which could have affected the content about national government.

Table 4-8: Government Support in the News

Country	Culture- Government Support Description	Average Government Stance in the News*
United States	News considered most likely to be “watchdog” of government ¹¹²	2.29 (2=neutral) (N with stance=14)
Germany	Considered likely to be “watchdog” of government but more supportive than the American or British models ¹¹³	1.94 (N with stance=17)
Britain	Considered likely to be “watchdog” of government, some continental European influences may make more likely to be supportive ¹¹⁴	1.92 (N with stance=13)
Spain	Considered most likely to be supportive of the government, works closer with government than other models ¹¹⁵	1.84 (N with stance=50)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward the government. Those that did not show a stance were not included in the calculation.

The frequencies of each stance show a similar trend in Table 4-9. The American coverage had supportive stories most often, with five percent of the coverage being supportive. American coverage also had the least frequent unsupportive stories of all of the newspapers, with two percent of the coverage being unsupportive. Spanish coverage

¹¹² Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

Hanitzsch, “Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus,” 487.

¹¹³ Ibid., 246 and 487.

¹¹⁴ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 246.

Hanitzsch, “Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus,” 487.

had the most frequent unsupportive stories at five percent while British coverage had the least frequent stories in the supportive category at two percent. The American news was least likely show a stance whereas the Spanish news was most likely.

Table 4-9: Frequency of Government Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole percent)

Country	No Government Stance	Not Supportive	Neutral/Balanced	Supportive
United States	90%	2%	3%	5%
Britain	87%	3%	8%	2%
Germany	89%	4%	4%	3%
Spain	81%	5%	12%	2%
<i>Total Number of Articles in Each Category</i>	552	26	48	20

H3 dealt with another measure of culture in the news, which was opinion.

Opinion in news was measured by whether a news article was on a news page or an opinion page in the newspaper. Based on the results of previous studies, Spanish news was supposed to have the most, followed by German and British. American coverage should have had the least. The results did not support this hypothesis.

Table 4-10: Opinion in the News

Country	Culture- Opinion in News Description	Average Opinion in the News
Britain	Expected to have less opinion ¹¹⁶	1.25 (1=news page story, 2=opinion page story) (N of opinion=25)
Spain	Expected to have the most opinion in the news, news culture mixes opinion and fact ¹¹⁷	1.24 (N of opinion=62)
United States	Expected to have the least opinion ¹¹⁸	1.17 (N of opinion=23)
Germany	Expected to have some opinion, news culture values offering multiple viewpoints ¹¹⁹	1.12 (N of opinion=18)

¹¹⁶ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 246.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 246.

The average of the opinion measure for each newspaper showed British coverage had the largest skew toward opinion. The Spanish average closely followed the British one, with an average of 1.24 and 1.25 respectively, as Table 4-10 shows. The difference between Britain and Spain was not very big in this case. What was surprising was that German coverage had the smallest skew toward opinion at 1.12. Even the results showing the average number of characters in opinion pieces did not support the hypothesis. Rather, it showed the inverse of the trend shown by the skew, as Table 4-11 shows. German news had the longest opinion pieces, followed by the American, Spanish, and finally the British. The short British opinion pieces made sense because the British articles were rather short overall. The others were also fairly close to the overall average of articles shown in Table 4-1, although Germany had slightly longer opinion pieces than the United States. That difference could be a reflection of a greater focus on opinion in German news than in American news.

Table 4-11: Average Number of Characters in Opinion Pieces

Newspaper's Country	Average Number of Characters (w/Spaces)
United States	5,366
Britain	4,331
Germany	5,836
Spain	4,949

¹¹⁹ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The patterns and trends found in relation to the research questions and hypotheses in some ways point to differences between countries and in other ways point to similarities that previous research overlooked.

Amount of Coverage and Topic

It was not surprising that the Spanish and German samples had the most articles in them because those two countries are deeply involved in the euro crisis. However, it was a little surprising that the British sample had the least overall despite Britain being a part of the European Union. A comparison of the amount of coverage in each time period gave a possible explanation. The British and American newspapers had similar amounts of coverage during the selected weeks in June 2011 and January/February 2012.

American coverage had 59 articles total during these periods while British coverage had 60. However, in the June 2012 and September 2012 selected weeks, British coverage dropped to only 40 articles whereas American coverage produced 77 articles. Perhaps British coverage decreased because Prime Minister David Cameron refused to take part in the second Greek bailout in 2011. Cameron thus distanced Britain from the Eurozone's problems.

The distribution of topic categories was fairly similar in all four countries. The similarities show that reality influenced topic choice more than other factors. Overall, coverage focused extensively on bailouts, meetings, and the societal effects of the crisis, showing that journalists in those countries considered those topics most important. Differences in topic frequency pointed to what was specifically important in each country. However, the differences pointed to the influence of reality, just more

specifically the realities within each country. Meetings stories were slightly more prominent in British news than in the others, perhaps because that was the extent to British involvement in the crisis and trying to resolve it. Otherwise, business effects stories were also more frequent in the British coverage than in the others, possibly also showing how Britain's business relations connected the country to the crisis.

The Spanish coverage also hinted at what was more important for Spain, which the resistance and banking story frequencies showed. Those types of stories were probably more prominent in Spanish coverage because of the protests and banking crisis taking place in Spain at the time. However, quite often the stories in these categories focused on similar happenings in other countries, like neighboring Portugal.

The German coverage had the most frequent bailout stories and the least frequent austerity stories. Those statistics could probably stem from a concern that a bailout would mean a loss for Germany. The country would have to pay more than others would to countries that may not be able to pay back the loans. Austerity could also be old news to the German journalists who probably wrote about it when Germany adopted them before the crisis.

American coverage often included elements that would make the euro crisis more interesting or relevant to the reader. Market effects, human interest, and historical comparison stories were more frequent in American coverage than in the others. The market effects stories always connected what was happening in Europe to stock market volatility in New York. Journalists used information about events in Europe to explain changes in the stock market. Historical comparison stories usually compared the euro crisis to the recession in the United States in 2008. The comparison stories, like the

market effects stories, made the United States a part of the story of Europe. When the United States could not be a part of the story, human interest stories were probably a more compelling way to present euro crisis information to people less affected by the crisis than dry reports.

The handful of stories in the “unique topic” subcategory also pointed to some difference in perspective in each country. The stories in the unique subcategory were each one of a kind. The ones that stood out in this subcategory were particularly telling of differences in perspective among the countries studied, especially in the German and Spanish samples. For example, the German newspaper had a story about a survey of Europeans about attitudes toward certain European nationalities.¹²⁰ The article title was “Europeans find the Germans to be the Hardest-Working.” Economic news seemed to affect the results of the survey beyond the detail the headline included. The author also related the results to what was happening in the euro crisis. The people who took the survey considered Greeks, Italians, and Spaniards to be the laziest people in Europe. These countries also happened to have economic difficulties during the crisis. The survey indicated a widespread negative view of the Greeks, perhaps because of the two bailouts Greece had received by the time the newspaper published the article. The results showed a positive view of Germans, with mostly Greek respondents showing a dislike of Germans. None of the other newspapers in this thesis wrote anything about the survey. The positivity toward Germans and Germany probably made the survey newsworthy in the German newspaper. “Suffering from Capitalism” was another unique story from the

¹²⁰ Hendrik Kafsack, “Europäer halten die Deutschen für die Fleißigsten,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 12, 2012.

German newspaper.¹²¹ The story discussed the pros and cons of capitalism. The possible role of capitalism in the euro crisis also came up in the discussion.

The unique stories that stood out in the Spanish coverage tended to show the perspective of a bailout recipient in multiple ways. For example, while the headline “Greece Pushes Europe to the Limit” might lead the reader to believe the story would deal with the Greek bailout or austerity measures, the focus of the story took a different approach. The article was about German Euroscepticism.¹²² The author explained German Euroscepticism from a variety of angles, including German economic policy trends and the government’s concern with pleasing the German public. Another article dealt with federalism in Europe.¹²³ Federalism has been subject to debate in Europe because some countries want more of it in the EU while others want less. More federalism in the EU would mean a division of power among a central political authority for the entire EU and the individual member states. A push toward more federalism in Europe would change the division of power, possibly to give more power to states that did not have much say in the founding treaties of the EU, like Spain.

Austerity

The data supported the austerity hypothesis. The fact that the articles that had a stance overall mirrored the national policies toward austerity showed that austerity policy was influential in how newspapers covered austerity in those countries. However, the majority of the articles in the sample had no stance toward austerity. Even though austerity policies were a big part of economic politics in the crisis, austerity did not play

¹²¹ Heike Göbel, “Leiden am Kapitalismus,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 30, 2012.

¹²² Claudi Pérez, “Grecia pone a Europa al límite,” *El País*, June 19, 2011, 30.

¹²³ “Los expertos apuestan por el federalismo,” *El País*, February 3, 2012, 6.

as big of a role in coverage of the crisis as other parts of the crisis did. If austerity had played a bigger role in coverage, more coverage would have had a stance.

The overall lack of stance raises questions about whether the Western notion of objectivity had an effect on content in this case. Scholars and journalists have a hard time defining what objective news is, although the accepted definition is typically unbiased or balanced coverage.¹²⁴ While the absence of stance toward a particular policy or institution might indicate a certain balance in the presentation of that policy or institution, lack of stance does not make the article objective. All actions involve choice. Other aspects of the article could be imbalanced. Choosing which topics to cover and how to cover them is subjective and involves bias.¹²⁵ There is also inherent bias in decisions of which facts and quotes are important enough to include.¹²⁶ While the high percentage of articles without a stance could indicate the journalists tried to remain objective by balancing viewpoints, the choices they made could never be objective. The coverage they produced could also never be objective.

Even though most articles did not show any stance toward austerity, the sample did show some differences in perspective. The tension between German austerity backers and Spanish politicians trying to avoid more imposed austerity measures brought about a few interesting examples.

The stories in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* that were positive toward austerity took a variety of forms. Some went into the background of German austerity to prove a point.

¹²⁴ Stephen J. Berry, "Why Objectivity Still Matters," *Nieman Reports* (Summer 2005), accessed April 12, 2014, <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101090/Why-Objectivity-Still-Matters.aspx>

¹²⁵ John H. McManus, "Objectivity: It's Time to Say Goodbye," *Nieman Reports* (Summer 2009), accessed April 12, 2014 <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101564/Objectivity-Its-Time-to-Say-Goodbye.aspx>

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

For example, in an article titled “Europe’s Iron Lady,” the author points out that German austerity reforms before Chancellor Angela Merkel took office in 2005 were controversial at first. However, the reforms worked well after a few years, which is why Germany is in a good position economically. The author pointed out that similar measures could work in other countries too, although austerity would look different in each place because all situations are different.¹²⁷ Despite taking some time to work, austerity measures had a positive influence on the German economy. Other stories focused on other countries. Sometimes they would focus on austerity measures going into effect in other countries, highlighting the resilience of those governments in trying to reach economic goals. The article “Portugal Raises Taxes” focused on such resilience. The coverage praised Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho because his austerity and consolidation programs made him the “model student” among the indebted Mediterranean countries.¹²⁸ Unlike other leaders of indebted countries, he kept moving forward in austerity, even when the public objected. In other cases, the coverage blamed problems on governments not following austerity plans as they promised they would.¹²⁹ Had the governments followed the austerity plans, problems would not have arisen.

Spanish coverage used different expert opinions and focused on different facts from the German coverage when handling austerity, all of which painted a different picture. Sometimes the statements about austerity were simple. For example, the “sacred” austerity became too expensive,¹³⁰ did not produce desirable results as other

¹²⁷ Ralph Bollmann, “Europas Eiserne Lady,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 29, 2012.

¹²⁸ Leo Wieland, “Portugal erhöht Steuern,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 25, 2012.

¹²⁹ Tobias Piller, “Griechische Lücken,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 23, 2012.

¹³⁰ Enrique Gil Calvo, “La deriva europea hacia el colapso,” *El País*, February 3, 2012, 23.

measures would,¹³¹ and failed to help any country in the Eurozone reduce structural deficits.¹³² Other articles were more colorful in descriptions of the dangers of austerity. One pointed to the cuts and reforms as not only harming the credibility of the euro, but also as part of an inadequate response to recession in the southern countries.¹³³ Another pointed to nepotism and corruption among politicians as a reason for austerity not working.¹³⁴

Perhaps the strongest arguments made against austerity in Spanish coverage were comparative in nature. One piece equated what was happening in Greece, presumably because of austerity measures, to the negative effects in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles that led to political upheaval and contributed to the rise in extremism.¹³⁵ Another piece about Greece quoted a Greek politician as saying that those asking Greece to increase austerity and privatization are asking that he “support a medicine for someone who is dying because of that very medicine.”¹³⁶ Both examples show very strong aversion to austerity measures and their effects. The comparison to the Treaty of Versailles is very strong because many researchers consider the treaty part of what contributed to the rise of Nazism in Germany. The other comparison is strong because it means austerity is killing the Greek economy instead of helping it.

Coding included American stance toward austerity despite American stance not being a part of the hypothesis. Even though Spain was the one fearing the imposition of

¹³¹ Carmen Morán, “La crisis sitúa a un millón más de españoles en riesgo de pobreza,” *El País*, January 31, 2012, 32.

¹³² Sami, “Nuestra piel; Los Estados aplican recetas destructoras, bajo la batuta de una Alemania conservadora,” *El País*, January 28, 2012, 6.

¹³³ Claudi Pérez, “Davos ve tres riesgos: el euro, Europa, y la UE,” *El País*, January 29, 2012, 24.

¹³⁴ Pedro Arregui, “La política de recortes,” *El País*, January 28, 2012, 26.

¹³⁵ Antón Costas Comesaña, “La necesidad de hacer preguntas difíciles,” *El País*, June 19, 2011, 19.

¹³⁶ “La UE condiciona la ayuda a Grecia al pacto político de Gobierno y oposición,” *El País*, June 24, 2011, 23.

austerity measures, American news coverage had the least favorable skew toward austerity. Perhaps this came from American politics using a different vocabulary to describe austerity. Alternatively, maybe the higher frequency of human interest stories in American coverage influenced the measurements. The human interest stories often showed the personal effects of governmental austerity in Europe, none of which were positive.

Bailouts

The data did not support the hypothesis on bailout stance. Even though the British refused to take part in bailouts in the EU while Germany, although maybe begrudgingly, took part in them, British news favored bailouts more than German news did. In this case, the policy of no international bailouts did not affect news coverage. It was as if bailouts in Europe were fine, just as long as Britain did not have to be a part of them.

Even though bailout stories were the most frequent of any topic, the majority of articles did not have a stance toward bailouts. As with austerity policy, this lack of stance could show that while bailouts were a major part of how the EU dealt with the crisis showing a stance on bailouts was not as important as just reporting on them. However, there was some interesting tension in how each newspaper presented its stances.

The German coverage was slightly more negative than the other coverage. The coverage showed its stance through the opinions it chose to include as well as the factual details about bailouts it focused on. Quite often, the possible effects in Germany of bailouts in other countries became the focus. For instance, some articles pointed out that bailouts to other Eurozone countries could affect inflation levels within Germany. An

increase in inflation would negatively affect everyone's finances, especially "the savers, the retired, and the poor."¹³⁷ Articles also presented Eurobonds, a possible way for the European Central Bank to aid the indebted countries, as negative for Germany. One article included the quote "Eurobonds would drive Germany to ruin."¹³⁸ Even though Germany took part in aid to others, the thought of too much aid created negativity in the coverage.

Other articles that focused on the negative side of bailouts dealt with how they were ineffective in the countries that had taken them. In terms of Greece, the German coverage would often compare the country's need for aid as a "bottomless pit." In one such case, the author called the economic reality politically taboo and criticized Brussels for offering Greece more aid after Greece failed to adhere to the austerity terms of previous aid.¹³⁹ Another article went so far as to say that the Greek rescue package was not good for anyone.¹⁴⁰ The German coverage criticized the bailout in Spain less, although the coverage was still not positive. One article that covered the bailout as not working focused on the bailout bringing the Spanish government's debt to "critical" levels rather than helping the banks there.¹⁴¹ In general, many stories that focused on bailouts not working focused on the costs of the bailouts, not only for Germany, but also for other countries.

The politics of bailouts also became the focus of a few stories with less than favorable stances on bailouts. One story focused on the pressure on Germany to bail out

¹³⁷ Heike Göbel, "Preis-Fragen zur Inflation," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 16, 2012.

¹³⁸ Stefan Ruhkamp and Bettina Schulz, "Streit in EZB über Notfallplan," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 15, 2012.

¹³⁹ Holger Steltzner, "Spaltpilz Europas," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 29, 2012.

¹⁴⁰ Lisa Nienhaus, "Nichts ist gut in Griechenland," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 19, 2011.

¹⁴¹ Werner Mussler, "Spaniens Schuldenstand nähert sich kritischem Wert," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 11, 2012.

the weaker economies in the Eurozone, saying that “Germany does not have unending strength.” The story went on to say that those who expected Germany to be able to fix everything were living in a “fairytale.”¹⁴² Others complained of indebted countries not wanting to deal with the consequences of their bailouts. One article addressed the complaints from indebted countries that austerity terms to the loans infringed on their sovereignty by pointing out the other side of sovereignty: being willing to fail alone.¹⁴³ Essentially the author was saying that if the indebted governments want help from other countries to get out of debt, they have to deal with the repercussions. The indebted countries cannot expect sovereignty and outside help at the same time. There had to be a trade-off. Another piece criticized the Spanish bailout because it had better terms than the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bailouts. The author called the Spanish rescue a bailout “without political costs” because “the rescuers may only watch” while “the debtors dictate the rules.”¹⁴⁴ The article had the same stance as the previous one, that the recipients of the bailouts are not the ones who should be dictating the terms. If the debtors can dictate the terms, then they can take advantage of the countries that better managed their economies.

Spanish coverage showed aspects of the other side of bailouts. One way coverage did that was to emphasize a need for bailouts because of possible positive economic effects. One such article said that austerity policies alone could not fix anything and that growth and stimulus policies would fix the economy.¹⁴⁵ When there was speculation that the Spanish government would request financial help from the EU, an article with a

¹⁴² Holger Steltzner, “Euro-Illusionen,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 2012.

¹⁴³ Georg Paul Hefty, “Europäisiert,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 11, 2012.

¹⁴⁴ Heike Göbel, “Spaniens Reform-Rabatt,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 10, 2012.

¹⁴⁵ Miguel Ángel Villena, “Solo con austeridad no se saldrá de la crisis’, avisa el secretario para la UE,” *El País*, February 3, 2012, 6.

positive stance covered the Spanish stock market doing the best it had all year. The author attributed the improved performance to the speculation of a bank bailout.¹⁴⁶ Other articles that focused on the good side of the bailout pointed out the need for one in Spain. The opinions came from European experts¹⁴⁷ as well as the American president, Barack Obama, when he was campaigning for reelection.¹⁴⁸

Another way Spanish coverage focused on the positive side of bailouts was to praise the European decision to offer one to Spain. The coverage also praised the better terms Spain managed to get on the loan. Before European leaders formally agreed upon the bailout, one article highlighted Germany's willingness to give Spain better terms than other indebted countries. However, at that point it was still uncertain whether Spain would actually take a bailout.¹⁴⁹ Even after Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy formally asked for help, coverage praised the terms of the loan, saying they were "very favorable for stability."¹⁵⁰ Another article welcomed the bailout, saying, "Spain will finally be rescued."¹⁵¹ Yet another used the supportive opinion of the bailout from an expert from Citi, who said, "The Eurogroup agreement is very positive. It is more than a bailout; it is an umbrella. They have given coverage to Spain and, incidentally, have created a new mechanism considering other countries with similar problems. They have sent a message of greater European financial integration to the market."¹⁵² According to

¹⁴⁶ J.S. González, "El Ibex 35 cierra la mejor semana del año al subir el 8,03%," *El País*, June 9, 2012, 24.

¹⁴⁷ Ángel Laborda, "Algo se mueve en Europa," *El País*, September 16, 2012, 22.

¹⁴⁸ Antonio Caño, "Obama pone su reelección en manos de la UE," *El País*, June 9, 2012, 3.

¹⁴⁹ Juan Gómez and Luis Doncel, "Alemania plantea rescatar a España con condiciones más suaves a través del FROB," *El País*, June 7, 2012, 21.

¹⁵⁰ Amanda Mars, "Guindos: 'Esto es un préstamo en condiciones muy ventajosas,'" *El País*, June 10, 2012, 30.

¹⁵¹ Claudi Pérez and Luis Doncel, "Rescate a España," *El País*, June 10, 2012, 1.

¹⁵² David Fernández, "España gana una batalla al mercado, pero la Guerra sigue," *El País*, June 11, 2012, 27.

the Spanish coverage, a bailout could only have positive effects on Spain and the markets.

Most of the coverage in *The Times* had a neutral stance toward bailouts. However, the coverage about bailouts and meetings deciding on bailouts was often quite critical of the leaders involved in them. Both Greece and Germany became the focus of criticism because of the roles each country played in bailouts.

In the case of Greece, the coverage related to the bailout typically called for Greece to leave the euro before bringing the entire Eurozone down with it.¹⁵³ Sometimes coverage went so far as to say the damage Greece had already done could not be undone.¹⁵⁴ However, even though Greece was not running its economy properly with the help it had already received, Greece was not to blame, according to the British coverage at least. Germany was at fault for not wanting to help more. Coverage went into how Cameron lectured Merkel about European trade imbalances creating more need for economic aid,¹⁵⁵ as well as other ways the Germans have been unfair. One article from the time of the second Greek bailout complained of how the Germans refused to accept blame for the situation in Greece. According to the article, the Germans should have known they would have to support other weaker countries.¹⁵⁶ Later on, during the global economic meeting in Davos, Merkel was the target of criticism. When focusing on the meeting itself, the author described Merkel's speech as "lackluster" and noted that the

¹⁵³ Charles Grant, "Greece doesn't belong in the euro. It must go; Poor leadership blights the Eurozone but a slimmed-down membership will help," *The Times*, June 20, 2011, 20.

¹⁵⁴ "Exit Strategy; Europe's debt crisis cannot be resolved without recognizing that Greece will default and should leave the euro. The Times proposes a way to make it happen," *The Times*, January 31, 2012, 2.

¹⁵⁵ David Wighton, "Don't lecture the Germans (at least not until next year)," *The Times*, January 27, 2012, 40-1.

¹⁵⁶ "Membership Dues; The German people have benefited handsomely from the euro. Now it is time for them to pay up if they want to keep the club together," *The Times*, June 17, 2011, 2.

“anger directed at Germany was particularly fervent,”¹⁵⁷ a detail not included in the Davos coverage in the other newspapers. When dealing with the content of what Merkel said about bailouts, another article said that Merkel “embarrassed everybody” with her idea for more oversight in countries receiving bailouts. After a discussion of everything wrong with the situation, the author concluded, “Germany is willing to ‘do whatever it takes’ to save the euro, apart from any of the things that would actually work.”¹⁵⁸ The views in *The Times* coverage of countries involved in bailouts ranged from blaming countries that needed bailouts for the problems in Europe to blaming the countries bailing out the weaker countries for the problems in Europe.

American stance toward bailout would have been the most favorable had it been part of the hypothesis. Maybe this has something to do with the bailouts and stimulus the American government did years before. It could have also had something to do with Obama pushing growth policies in Europe to improve the global economy.

Government Support

The results failed to support the government support hypothesis. The lack of support for this hypothesis shows that the assumption that attitudes can predict content is not correct, at least in this case. This is in line with part of the findings of Van Dalen et al.¹⁵⁹ Here, the role perceptions journalists reported concerning national government support had no bearing on the stances demonstrated in the content. That means that journalists’ attitudes do not necessarily have an effect on content.

¹⁵⁷ Sam Fleming, “Respite but no rescue; Economic view,” *The Times*, January 30, 2012, 33.

¹⁵⁸ Anatole Kaletsky, “Crises and bailouts are what’s best for the euro; We have three options: collapse of the currency (disaster), Germany forced out (no chance), or stagger on,” *The Times*, February 2, 2012, 23.

¹⁵⁹ Van Dalen et al., “Different Roles, Different Content?” 913-4.

The results placed German and British news in the hypothesized positions in the ranking, which supported the findings by Hallin and Mancini in 2004. However, the American and Spanish newspapers were the opposite. Spanish news was the least supportive of its government while American news was the most supportive. In this situation, the results did not support findings of Hallin and Mancini. Maybe it was because of the specific subject matter and time periods. During these time periods, Spain elected a new leader, Mariano Rajoy, who broke many promises. Part of his campaign was his promise to avoid a bailout from the EU. A lot of coverage complained of Rajoy changing his mind about needing a bailout, not calling the Spanish bailout a bailout, and not understanding what was happening in his own country.

Quite a few of the stories that had a negative stance toward the government aimed negativity directly at Rajoy. The criticism started already in January 2012, when the EU leaders had summits to attend and were visiting with other leaders. One article criticized Rajoy for always “trying to confuse,” pointing out that he would say one thing about austerity in a speech in Lisbon and then another thing about austerity in Berlin.¹⁶⁰ The complaints about Rajoy changed in June 2012, when Spain was getting a bailout. The journalists did not seem happy with Spain getting a bailout. One article said that Rajoy did not really think the decision through and was “absent during the first moments of the rescue.”¹⁶¹ Another around the same time overflowed with negative opinions about Rajoy. His resistance to calling the bank rescue what it was, a rescue, “has undermined his image and that of Spain.” The euphemisms caused other European leaders to lose

¹⁶⁰ Carlos E. Cué and Fernando Garea, “El Gobierno cree que se flexibilizará el déficit pero Rajoy no se lo pide a Merkel. El presidente busca en Berlín atraerse a la canciller con promesas de austeridad,” *El País*, January 27, 2012, 11.

¹⁶¹ Joaquín Estefanía, “A mí, ¿quién me rescata?” *El País*, June 11, 2012, 25.

confidence in Rajoy because they did not understand “if the sale of ‘not-a-rescue’ was marketing or inability to comprehend reality.”¹⁶² The article also contained a quote from a writer for *La Repubblica*, Francesca Caferri, along similar lines: “There is also a big surprise with Rajoy. It seems he does not know where he is going. His changes in course, that help is not needed, that now yes, but it is not called a rescue, generate confusion and lack of confidence. He is either a liar or does not know what he is doing.”¹⁶³ Later on, in September, coverage accused Rajoy of being too partisan.¹⁶⁴

Other Spanish journalists blamed the government in general rather than directly criticizing Rajoy. The authors criticized the government for not making the right reforms to make bank improvements easier¹⁶⁵ and preventing austerity measures from working.¹⁶⁶ Another piece accused politicians of being out of touch and paid too much.¹⁶⁷

As for the United States, the unexpected support could be because the country was not a part of the euro crisis. International coverage is different from domestic coverage. The stories in the sample that had a stance toward the American government generally pointed out what worked for the United States in the 2008 recession or during other times of economic difficulty as responsible government action. For example, articles from around the time of the Spanish bailout decision highlighted why that decision was a bad one while the similar decisions made in the United States years before were smarter. One hinted that the Europeans did not follow the American example correctly, calling the individual bailouts that have been used as needed in Europe “a

¹⁶² Ramón Lobo, “El precio de no decir rescate,” *El País*, June 13, 2012, 30.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Xavier Vidal-Folch, “Mariano, no seas partidista,” *El País*, September 20, 2012, 19.

¹⁶⁵ Miguel Jiménez, “El FMI critica que se permitiera a cajas débiles fusionarse entre sí,” *El País*, June 11, 2012, 28.

¹⁶⁶ J. Gómez, “Merkel pide tiempo para el futuro organismo de vigilancia financiera,” *El País*, September 26, 2012, 20.

¹⁶⁷ Raquel Artigot, “Más que indignada,” *El País*, September 26, 2012, 28.

fool's errand."¹⁶⁸ The Europeans were not following the American example well because they would not increase the government-backed account limit. The increase in the account limit was the "unsung hero of ending the crisis" in the United States, not just the stimulus. In another example of Europe not following the American example correctly, the author praised former president George W. Bush's strategy in dealing with banks that were too big to fail. However, Europe's approach in dealing with Spain, which is also too big to fail for the EU, the author wrote off as not the way to go. The author wondered why Germany did not take similar measures to those the American government did.¹⁶⁹ Going farther back in history, another piece from around the same time praised the Marshall Plan that the American government put into place after World War II. The main argument was that Germany needed to have the "same sense of urgency and vision that America did after World War II with the Marshall Plan, a farsighted program of assistance for the reconstruction of Europe."¹⁷⁰ The plan Germany already had, the author said, could be a threat to democracy.

Even in covering American involvement in the euro crisis, the coverage that had a stance on the American government painted the picture of the United States as a leader with the best ways to handle problems. A piece about an American financial diplomat emphasized the American involvement in fixing the euro issues. At one point, the article stated, "At times, the Treasury Department's presence has proved crucial in moving Europe back from the brink."¹⁷¹ This article and the ones previously explained all made a

¹⁶⁸ Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Why the Bailout in Spain won't Work," *The New York Times*, June 12, 2012, B1.

¹⁶⁹ Joe Nocera, "How Not to Solve a Crisis," *The New York Times*, June 12, 2012, A25.

¹⁷⁰ Charles S. Maier, "Europe Needs a German Marshall Plan," *The New York Times*, June 10, 2012, SR4.

¹⁷¹ Annie Lawrey, "At Euro Talks, a Calm Arm-Twister from the U.S.," *The New York Times*, January 27, 2012, B1.

point of placing the American government in the global leadership role rather than just another piece in the global political and economic puzzle.

Opinion

The data did not support the opinion hypothesis. Britain had the most stories on opinion pages while Germany had the least, which was unexpected. German news had the longest opinion pieces while British news had the shortest ones. This discrepancy with the previous research could be because the coding considered only whether the articles were on an opinion page or filed as an opinion piece on the database or website. Coding for that rather than the more subjective decision of whether a piece was an opinion piece perhaps worked better for the American and British coverage. The previous research about media models show there is greater separation between news and opinion in American and British news.¹⁷² There were examples in the German and Spanish samples that read somewhat like opinion pieces but were not filed as opinion pieces or editorials. Those stories were coded as news because of how the newspapers filed them. Different coding could have increased the number of opinion pieces in both the Spanish and German samples. Such an increase could have produced a ranking more similar to that in previous research. In addition, it could be possible that opinion pieces that appeared in print versions of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* did not make it to the website and therefore would not have shown up in the sample.

Regardless of whether the British news was truly more opinionated than the others were or if that were only so in the coding scheme used, British editorials showed the Euroscepticism found in previous research.¹⁷³ Beyond just doubtfulness of

¹⁷² See Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 246.

¹⁷³ Temple, *The British Press*, 194.

Europeans' ability to take care of their own problems, some stories criticized European integration in general. Quite often, the point was that Britain was lucky to be separate from the Eurozone because of all of the debt problems there.¹⁷⁴ Others covered a possible referendum that anti-Europeans proposed in Britain to determine whether the country should integrate more or less with Europe. One piece argued that Britain was not part of Europe and never will be.¹⁷⁵ Another presented European integration as flawed and a source of division in Europe.¹⁷⁶ Yet another said that the British public revered the monarchy more than the European Council. The same article blamed German economic policy both before the euro and during the crisis for the possible referendum in Britain.¹⁷⁷

Even though the results for the hypotheses did not show as much of a relationship between culture and news coverage as previous research did, other indicators hinted at some influence from culture. For example, of the articles with a stance on austerity, bailouts, or government, Spanish news was overall more likely than the others to have a stance, which would support the higher tendency to be partisan in Spanish press.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ David Budworth, "Time to enter the euro-billions," *The Times*, June 9, 2012, 59.

¹⁷⁵ David Owen, "My vision for a new Europe; The Owen Plan," *The Times*, June 7, 2012, 24.

¹⁷⁶ "The Europe Question; The euro crisis will force Britons to make a choice between being part of the fuller union of a federal government or a common trading bloc," *The Times*, June 7, 2012, 2.

¹⁷⁷ William Rees-Mogg, "There's only one question on Europe: in or out; The Owen Plan is right to reassess Britain's place in the EU but the people need a simple way to make an exit," *The Times*, June 8, 2012, 26.

¹⁷⁸ Egido, "Ideología en el Lenguaje Económico de la Prensa Española Actual," 124.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The results supported one out of four hypotheses. The lack of support for the bailout hypothesis could stem from the British wanting bailouts in Europe that do not involve Britain. The coverage showed a simultaneous push for Germany to pay for weaker Eurozone countries and desire for Britain to stay insulated from Europe's problems. Policy could only reflect the desire for insulation.

The lack of support for the culture hypotheses could come down to methodology. Previous research that used surveys of journalists and general impressions of journalism to find cultural differences provided the basis for the culture hypotheses. The differences the previous research found were not necessarily differences that would appear in content. Van Dalen et al. found that the attitudes journalists present in surveys do not always match the patterns in content.¹⁷⁹ General impressions of cultural differences in the media systems in Hallin and Mancini's 2004 study might also not show themselves in content, especially if media systems are becoming more similar.¹⁸⁰ This means that cultural differences as shown in surveys and qualitative studies may not show up in quantitative studies of content. In this case, content did not reflect the attitudes of journalists. The assumption that attitudes affect content is not true, at least in this context. The best way to understand news content is to measure it directly.

While the results did not show as much difference as expected in the hypotheses, the results still have other implications. The lack of difference in some areas could mean that news content is becoming more similar in different countries instead of maintaining differences. However, the difference that was there could also have some meaning.

¹⁷⁹ Van Dalen et al., "Different Roles, Different Content?" 913-4.

¹⁸⁰ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, 247-8.

Newspapers in different countries will not necessarily cover the same events in the same way. Point of view, which politics and culture can influence, has an effect on coverage. In this case, economic policy had more influence on how newspapers covered the euro crisis in a given country than the culture or journalistic attitudes of that country did. Policy could also have a greater influence than culture for other topics in economic coverage.

Outside of the news, the wider implications for Europe could be that true unity is a ways away. As the Spanish article comparing austerity to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles pointed out, more extreme politics may lie ahead.¹⁸¹ Right-leaning and far-right parties that are against a united Europe have already been gaining popularity throughout the continent. Many left-leaning and far-left parties are also against a united Europe. Beyond political parties, the secondary research already showed different views on European policy within the EU. The results from this thesis demonstrate that the news shows some differences as well. Not only were the opinions about policy different, but at times so were the facts the journalists selected. German coverage could focus on the positive side of austerity, using facts about reduction of national deficits, while a Spanish story could focus on the negative side of austerity, like lack of funds for social welfare or aid to poorer countries. Both are using facts about austerity but still manage to show a stance without using opinions. The presentation of different facts to people and policy makers in different countries could be problematic if more unity is Europe's goal.

A lot could be learned from these results, but this study still had limitations. Two measures for policy and two measures for culture in the news offer some information, but more could have made the results clearer. Tweaking some of the coding about opinion,

¹⁸¹ Comesaña, "La necesidad de hacer preguntas difíciles."

despite the possibility of making it more subjective, could also have made the results better, although running the risk of being less reliable. Closer examination of the adjectives used to describe austerity, bailouts, and government could have also given stance measures another dimension. Having access to the print version of the German newspaper through the same database as the others would have ensured every article that appeared in the print version of the paper would have appeared in the sample, not just the ones that also ended up on the website. Perhaps future research could expand the coding scheme to include more policy and culture measures, more time periods, and more newspapers to get a fuller picture of what is happening in the EU. Such a study could represent more countries and more viewpoints within the countries.

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Appendix: News Content Coding Sheet

Coding Sheet Number: _____

NEWSPAPER 1=*El País*, 2=*The Times*, 3=*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 4=*NYT* _____

DATE Date of the article (ex 0613 for June 13)..... _____

LENGTH Length of the article (in characters including spaces)..... _____

TOPIC 1=human interest, 2=austerity, 3=bailouts, 4=currency values..... _____
5=meetings, 6=resistance, 7=general effects, 8=miscellaneous

OPINION 1=News page coverage, 2=Opinion page piece..... _____

AUSTERITY What view of austerity did the item convey? 0=it didn't deal with
or focus on austerity, 1=negative, 2= neutral/balanced, 3=positive _____

BAILOUTS What view of bailouts for struggling countries did the item convey?
0= it didn't deal with or focus on loans, 1=negative, 2=neutral/
balanced, 3=positive..... _____